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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
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PROXIMATE CAUSE SHOULD BE BARRED FROM
WANDERING OUTSIDE NEGLIGENCE LAW
KENNETH VINSON*
I. THE CASE AGAINST CAUSE
In tort law's darkest corner lurks the concept of proximate
cause. Causation's mystifying riddles constitute the last refuge of
muddy thinkers. Proximate cause, with its two utterly different
meanings, spills too much ink and distorts legal debate over the
scope of tort liability. When lawyers and judges toss causation
rhetoric into briefs and opinions, the resulting babel smothers
common sense and further corrupts legal English. The fog of proxi-
mate causation seeps in because courts inanely mix value-neutral
cause in fact (who-did-it) with the policy matter of allocating acci-
dent costs (who-should-pay). This article suggests that, at least
with respect to strict liability torts, the proximate cause concept
should be outlawed.
The distinction between concrete cause in fact and blameworthy
("it was her fault") cause is easy to blur. Lay and legal people alike
do it, but only lawyers make a fetish of confusion. In fairness to
those who speak the legal tongue, the current bar inherited the
confusing doctrines of causation. Yet clear analysis of scope-of-lia-
bility problems demands that the legal process accommodate itself
to the very different intellectual tasks involved in discovering who-
did-it and judging who-should-pay. The lawyer-judge, who is both
historian and policymaker, needs a clearer language for talking
about past events and current values. Proximate cause lore won't
do.
In the trial of tort cases, the two faces of causation unduly com-
plicate keeping separate the is and the ought. For example, it's one
kind of job to trace empirically the history of this planet's pollu-
tion (cause in fact) back to the ape who crawled down a tree, uri-
nated in a stream, and first began upsetting nature's balance. It's
*Professor of Law, Florida State University. University of Texas, LL.B., 1959; Yale Uni-
versity, LL.M., 1964.
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quite another job to select, among a jungle of contributing factors,
which polluting apes deserve fine or jail for contaminating Mother
Earth. Who-did-it is history; who-should-pay is practical politics
(in its larger sense). Confusing history with politics, as is the legal
custom in proximate cause cases, makes for weak history and poor
politics.
The pity is that legal folk make so little effort to clean up causa-
tion pollution. Of course killing off proximate cause may be akin to
hindering the setting of the sun. Legal reforms come and go, but
proximate cause hangs on like death and taxes. Perhaps West Pub-
lishing Company, had it long ago undertaken to clean up legal lan-
guage, might have put a quota on "goobledegook" and retracted
proximate cause's key number. Or perhaps the Bar Committee on
Unauthorized Legalisms should have locked tortious causation
away for good along with the rack, the fellow servant rule, and
other legal monsters.
But proximate cause is so unruly and so devious that it's difficult
to close in for the kill. Proximate cause, in sum, is a common law
leviathan, a Moby Dick that surfaces at awkward moments from
the murky deep to do evil. This white whale with the legalistic eye
hypnotizes judges and juries into playing a shell game in which the
players ostensibly search for concrete facts while, under the table,
political choices are made.
For decades, a handful of legal realists, eager to free the law of
shell games, have made like Captain Ahab and given dogged chase
to Moby Dick. But for too long the bastard offspring of cause-and-
effect and cause-and-blame has eluded the harpoon. The legal
community, alas, may never talk common sense about allocating
accident costs, and judges may never draft risk-spreading ratio-
nales in language closer to the Queen's. But what the hell-here's
one more try at bringing in the proximate beast, belly up.
To start with, nobody's proud enough of proximate cause to step
forward and confess founding fathership. Even apologists for legal
formalism are embarrassed by the false front created by proximate
cause's muddled mixture of ideas about factual connection and
scope of liability. Only true believers in the pure milk of the horn-
book look at causation's two faces and see a single true rule. First-
year law students, for goodness sake, catch on by Christmas to the
subterfuge going on when courts purport to fish, from an ocean of
shadowy causes, for a big one named "proximate."
In tort cases, cause in fact is rarely in issue. Therefore, proxi-
mate (or legal) cause comes out being little more than a courtroom
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procedure for allowing judge and jury to decide, mostly on intui-
tion, who-should-pay. Causation equations are shockingly shy of
substantive meaning. In fact, most negligence law boils down to
mere procedure because abstractions such as foreseeability and le-
gal causation beg the liability question. Empty words are dead un-
til judge and jury make the choices that give life to the law.
Theories of recovery in negligence cases, and in most strict lia-
bility cases, are couched in terms so general that judge and jury
must regularly define limits to tort protection. Such liability-limit-
ing discretion involves choosing among political and social values.
Vague definitions of causation, no matter how often repeated, give
little aid in making such judgments. The traditional claims of legal
science to the contrary are false.
Proximate cause is, however, a handy device for judges who,
where the law is embarrassingly silent, cannot escape making polit-
ical, albeit masked, liability choices. Pointing toward causation's
dark corner is deemed better, apparently, than an outright lie, or
sitting mute. Thus proximate cause, with its pinch of concreteness
to a ton of fog, keeps the judge "above the fray" by tying the deci-
sion to the rule-of-law's brooding omnipresences.
Judges keen on passing the political buck need only find a prece-
dent by crouching in the nearest causation graveyard; there, like
ancient tribal medicine persons, robed leaders rattle dry bones un-
til the proximate finger of phantom fact points to the limit of the
law's detached protection. So traditional and so seductive is this
causation concept that, rather than eradicate the concept in its an-
cestral home in negligence law, it may be easier to replace negli-
gence law.
But outside negligence law, there's a chance that common sense
and plain English can overcome the ills of leaning too heavily on
the frail causation reed. In developing areas of strict tort liability,
there is no proximate cause tradition, and therefore, no justifica-
tion for rattling causation bones to make rain. In damage suits in-
volving defective products or no-fault automobile insurance, set-
ting liability limits cries out for judicial candor and leadership. To
be avoided is passing the proximate buck to juries along with misty
generalities about misty causes.
II. DOG SHANE DID IT
The Florida Supreme Court, however, in its most recent pro-
nouncement on proximate cause, Jones v. Utica Mutual Insurance
19851
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Co.,1 chose once again to do the Devil's work. That court turned
proximate cause loose to swim free in a no-fault dispute involving
a little boy and his dog Shane. Jones is a good case to show how
the law can be lured into sleeping with nonsense.
Dog Shane allowed her young master and two other boys to loop
a rope through her collar and harness her to a little red wagon. But
Shane proved too weak to pull a wagon full of beefy wagoners.
Soon the three boys gave up that sport but left Shane in harness.
Shane then gave chase to a dog belonging to twelve-year-old wag-
oner Donnie Jones. During that chase, the wagon, which Shane
still towed, struck and injured Donnie Jones' leg.2 Young Jones
sued Shane's owner under a century-old Florida Statutes making
dog owners strictly liable for their best friend's misdeeds. Shane's
owner defended all the way to the Florida Supreme Court and lost.
Five of seven justices ruled that the dog statute's no-fault cover-
age, though presumably subject to some limits, extended neverthe-
less to Shane's owner. The simple, maybe too simple, reason the
court gave for this harsh result was that Shane, as a matter of
cause in fact, caused Jones' injury. The problem with the Jones
rationale is that the real issue was who-should-pay, not who-did-it.
Jones is the latest in a series of strict liability cases5 in which
proximate cause, despite its confusion of meanings and unmistaka-
ble aura of fault, dominates judicial review of the scope of no-fault
protection in Florida and elsewhere. 6 Strict tort liability, remem-
1. 463 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1985).
2. Facts are drawn from the opinion of the district court in Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones,
408 So. 2d 769, 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), rev'd, 463 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1985).
3. FLA. STAT. § 767.01 (1979). As originally enacted in 1881, this statute offered no pro-
tection to personal injuries: "[O]wners of dogs shall be held liable and responsible for dam-
ages to sheep or other stock killed or maimed by their dogs." 1881 Fla. Laws 3294.
But in the 1892 compilation, § 2341 added personal injury protection: "Owners of dogs
shall be held liable for damages to persons and stock killed or injured by their dogs." For
additional legislative history, see infra note 61.
4. Jones, 463 So. 2d at 1157. The supreme court rejected the district court's judgment
that strict liability protection in § 767.01 was not designed to reach little-red-wagon inci-
dents; instead, it affirmed the trial judge's directed verdict of liability. Id. at 1155.
5. See infra notes 28, 70, 90, 92, 147, 158.
6. How to limit the scope of liability in strict liability cases is an old question. See
Harper, Liability Without Fault and Proximate Cause, 30 MICH. L. REv. 1001 (1932).
The tendency of courts to use causation doctrines to justify limits on strict liability (or in
the case of Jones to turn proximate cause on its head to rationalize a near-absolute liability)
means that judges avoid explicit clarification of no-fault goals. Such use of the slippery
proximate cause device to mask ad hoc groping for policy boundaries has been questioned
frequently. See, e.g., Maleson, Negligence Is Dead but Its Doctrines Rule Us from the
Grave: A Proposal to Limit Defendants' Responsibility in Strict Products Liability Actions
Without Resort to Proximate Cause, 51 TEMp. L.Q. 1, 17 (1978) (urging conscious assump-
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ber, is not absolute. Strict means strict only in a sense relative to
liability keyed to fault. Strict liability supposedly lies between lia-
bility for fault and the near-absolute liability of an insurer.7 How-
ever, when strict liability moves toward the negligence end of the
scale, some courts have incongruously mixed strict liability with
fault doctrine by using proximate cause (in its blameworthy sense)
as an excuse to bar strict liability claims. Thus do lawyers and
judges overly fond of universal nineteenth-century principles,
when sailing in the unchartered strict liability waters of the 1980's,
cling to fault as if to a life preserver.8
When judges in strict liability cases like Jones sneak in fault by
measuring liability in proximate cause terms, the resulting dia-
logue sounds like the Brave New World of, well, 1884: Did the per-
tinent no-fault dog (or defective lawnmower or no-fault vehicle), as
a direct consequence of a continuous sequence and without the
intervention of a superseding cause, probably, foreseeably, legally,
substantially, and proximately cause the plaintiff's hurts?9
tion by judges of the policymaking chore through adoption of Leon Green's duty-risk analy-
sis); Mull v. Ford Motor Co., 368 F.2d 713, 717 (2d Cir. 1966) (no place for foreseeability
since strict liability is based not on fault but on considerations of social policy); Oehler v.
Davis, 298 A.2d 895, 896-97 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1972); Keeton, Products Liability- Inadequacy
of Information, 48 TEx L. REv. 398, 415 (1970); Polelle, The Foreseeability Concept and
Strict Products Liability: The Odd Couple of Tort Law, 8 RurT.-Css. L. REv. 101, 109-13,
119-25 (1976). But see Note, Torts-Proximate Cause in Strict-Liability Cases, 50 N.C.
REv. 714, 720-25 (1972) (foreseeability test appropriate); cf. Lucas, The Philosophy of the
Reasonable Man, 13 PHEL. Q. 97 (1963) (stating that reasonable man is made of solid stuff).
The foreseeability test for proximate cause is applied differently in no-fault cases. Instead
of asking whether "the risk can be foreseen at the time of the negligent act," in strict liabil-
ity the defendant is liable if "the risk of harm can be foreseen at the time of embarking
upon the activity." Note, Strict Products Liability and the Bystander, 64 COLu.P L. Rv.
916, 935 (1964).
7. Jones is the rare case of not strict, but STRICT liability.
8. See Maleson, supra note 6, at 2-3 (footnotes omitted):
The revolution [overthrowing negligence law] may be illusory, however, as the
case law of the transition period appears to be at odds with the ringing declara-
tions ushering in this new era in products liability law. Strict products liability
emerges as a doctrine in search of historical underpinnings .... Lacking an ade-
quate theoretical substructure, courts have dealt with situations on an ad hoc ba-
sis and have turned to negligence terminology to justify all manner of divergent
conclusions in what purport to be strict liability decisions. The most disturbing
evidence of this trend is the emergence of proximate cause as a factor in limiting
the scope of a defendant's liability with virtually no inquiry concerning its appro-
priateness in a strict liability framework.
9. See Pope v. Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co., 120 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960), cert.
denied, 127 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1961), the state's most frequently cited opinion on proximate
cause. In this negligence case, the court attempted to capture the elusive magic of causation
with legalistic formulas tied to empty words such as "foreseeable" and "superseding" and
"intervening." But see Probert, Causation in the Negligence Jargon: A Plea for Balanced
1985]
220 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:215
The Jones opinion, with its proximate cause approach, clouds
the issue by transposing the problem of how far to extend the dog
statute (section 767.01) into a fake question about what Shane did.
The court in Jones thus bypassed the threshold question of what
the legislature intended to accomplish with its dog law. Of course,
looking into the well of legislative intent sometimes adds confu-
sion. When legislative history is vague (more later on whether sec-
tion 767.01's purpose is vague), perhaps courts should move toward
a forthright judicial shaping of the limits of statutory protection;
it's no surprise that courts have long been, and must continue to
be, partners with legislators in shaping legal codes. In Jones, how-
ever, the court ignored the ambiguity in section 767.01, which says
only that "[ojwners of dogs shall be liable for any damage done by
their dogs to sheep or other domestic animals or livestock, or to
persons."10 The Jones court merely closed one eye and ruled the
"Realism", 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 369, 388 (1965) (questioning whether anyone really believes
that terms like foreseeable, risk, proximate, duty, or cause can possibly control a court's
decision).
The Pope court's faulty incantations hardly fit contexts in which changing political and
moral ideas are pushing fault aside to make room for tort schemes keyed to compensating
large classes of victims; in effect, the circle back to the old trespass form of action with its
faultless liability is being completed. Partly this is a new social justice; partly it is economic
theory applied in the courtroom to reduce and more widely spread the liability costs of, for
example, mass-produced defective products.
Academic lawyers work to build sophisticated models for this new social justice. One
model-building article attempts to adapt causation doctrines to an "instrumentalist ap-
proach, under which the choices that can be made over the scope of liability are related
directly to well-specified social goals." Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of
Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 502 (1980). Shavell makes use of "deci-
sion theory" and of economic analysis spelled out in equation form. For a recent attempt to
capture proximate cause with economic equations, see Grady, Proximate Cause and the
Law of Negligence, 69 IOwA L. REv. 363 (1984). Social goals put into economic language are
perhaps the seeds of a brave new world of torts and not merely Pope v. Pinkerton-Hayes
formulas put in 1980's dress. But for now the fact is that judges and juries continue to sleep
with dotty old proximate cause, and, before more rational ways of shaping strict liability
goals can be developed, the ghosts of negligence must first be exorcised.
10. FLA. STAT. § 767.01 (1983) (emphasis added). Section 767.01's "liable for any dam-
age" language has been interpreted to mean strict liability. See Sweet v. Josephson, 173 So.
2d 444 (Fla. 1965), aff'g 173 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964); Knapp v. Ball, 175 So. 2d 808
(Fla. 3d DCA 1965). These cases also declare that § 767.01 covers damage "done by ...
dogs" other than by dog bite. The Sweet case also holds that FLA. STAT. § 767.04
(1979)-"Dog owner's liability for damages to persons bitten"- supersedes § 767.01 only in
relation to dog bite situations. See Seventh Survey of Florida Law (pt. 2), Torts, 20 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 820, 835 (1966).
What if dog bites dog? Since § 767.04 protects only "persons," the owner of a dog-bitten
canine must seek compensation under § 767.01's protection of "domestic animals." Such a
strict liability claim was recently pending in Keshan v. Martin, No. 84-6913 (Fla. 13th Cir.
Ct. filed May 9, 1984). The owner of a poodle named Max alleged that defendant's two
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statute's reach clearly embraced Shane: Shane done it, and that
was all there was to it under "traditional standards of proximate
causation."11
So, given the justices' "traditional standards," just how do we
ascertain section 767.01's coverage? The Jones majority reasoned
that Shane was a section 767.01 beast since "the injury in this case
would not have occurred 'but for' the animal."12 "But for," how-
ever, is a cause-in-fact matter of history, of physical cause-and-ef-
fect, whereas in Jones the history of Shane's little red wagon mis-
hap was undisputed. Reading section 767.01 exclusively in "but
for" terms leads to absurdity, as the following Big Shane hypothet-
ical shows. Big Shane is Shane's daddy. "But for" Big Shane, Don-
nie Jones' "injury would not have occurred." So, did both Shanes
do section 767.01 damage? Surely no court would follow the cause-
in-fact trial so blindly.
III. WATCHDOG TO GUARD CAUSE
Why do courts persist in injecting no-fault schemes with doses of
nineteenth-century fault? Why borrow from negligence law-of all
things-that awkward mix of who-did-it and who-should-pay with
which lawyers weaned on fault make mud pies? And why transpose
broad policy issues into proximate cause issues and thus shift to
so-called factfinders the power initially to set strict liability limits?
This Article deals with these questions first by analyzing the proxi-
mate cause concept and its role in allocating functions between
judge and jury. The Article next explains how transplanting proxi-
mate cause into strict liability contexts distorts the legal process.
And finally, this Article identifies cases (under Florida's dog stat-
ute, the state's automobile no-fault law, the state's workers' com-
labrador retrievers bit Max, causing damage to Max and also causing intentional mental
distress to Max's master. The case was settled out of court for $1,000. Thanks goes to Max's
lawyer, Lesley J. Friedsam, for this latest addition to my list of Sunshine State dog cases.
Telephone interview with Lesley J. Friedsam, Attorney for Plaintiff (June 27, 1985).
11. Jones, 463 So. 2d at 1157.
12. Id. The court through Justice Adkins did not quite say that the only causation predi-
cate to § 767.01 liability is cause in fact. But on the other hand, the court failed to recognize
explicitly that the real problem in Jones was not whether Shane's chase contributed to the
accident but whether the scope of § 767.01 liability ought to cover Jones' undisputed but
bizarre facts. The Jones court dealt with the matter of strict liability limits, if at all, merely
by putting yet another adjective in front of cause-"affirmative." Shane's act, said the court,
was "affirmative" rather than "passive." If by this labeling exercise the court meant that
Shane, in a scope-of-liability sense, was the proximate cause of Jones' hurts, then and only
then did the Jones court make total peace with the "traditional standards of proximate
causation."
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pensation system, and Florida's strict products liability law) that
suffer from the obfuscation which accompanies causation hide-
and-seek.
The underlying concern here is that posing the issue in causation
terms in cases like Jones-where the factual connection between
defendant and damage is obvious-means that Florida juries,
charged to grope for ultimate causes, are blindly setting policy for
the administration of strict liability torts. Appellate judges, more-
over, in second-guessing juries about blameworthy cause, absurdly
sift through empirical evidence of cause in fact when, in fact, who-
did-it or what-happened is clear and only who-should-pay is in
question."3 Such forms of Orwellian doublethink deserve rooting
out.
Negligence law's proximate cause is especially unsuitable for ex-
port into compensation schemes geared to create wider loss spread-
ing and to promote safety.14 The meanest critics of proximate
13. "Who done it" is Dean Pedrick's name for the cause-in-fact aspect of proximate
cause. Pedrick, Causation, the "Who Done It" Issue, and Arno Becht, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q.
645. The "Who Done It" reference seems to emphasize that the cause-in-fact inquiry is not
metaphysics but physics.
A more all-embracing phrase for use in focusing on cause in fact is "what happened." Of
course there are some lawyers, philosophers, and bass fishermen who assert the impossibility
of ever separating the notion of cause into separate matters of sensory description and eval-
uative judgment. My colleague, Dean Joshua Morse, lawyer, philosopher, and bass fisher-
man, points out that a purified cause in fact with all the judgment boiled out opens up every
tort suit to an infinity of causes, including Adam and Eve. Maybe the answer is to erase c-a-
u-s-e from legal language and substitute "what happened" or "who pays," inquiries that for
practical purposes point to the two different intellectual tasks involved in causation debates.
Of course there is no getting around the fact that all language is a trap and complete absti-
nence is the only sure way to avoid captivity. Charles Black illustrated this in his article,
Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights, HARPER'S MAC., Feb. 1961, at
63, 67:
Dr. Johnson, who was addicted both to accuracy and to veracity, said in substance
that if one stood before a great orchard and remarked, "There is no fruit in that
orchard," and there came a poring man who found two apples and three pears, the
first speaker would be right in dismissing the objection with laughter.
Professor Probert writes that arguments about splitting proximate cause "tend . . . to
show an unjustified faith in our underdeveloped nonmathematical legal language. . . . The
arguments tend too much to assume that 'facts' are outside one's skin and that 'values' are
on the inside .... " Probert, supra note 9, at 370. Probably so. But the judge-and-jury
show must go on, and as a practical matter I will go along with Dr. Johnson and say that
there is no fruit in that orchard. See also infra note 15; A. BECHT & F. MILLER, THE TEST OF
FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CASES (1961), for support of the
proposition that it is almost always possible to separate the tangle of fact and policy in
dealing with causation issues.
14. See Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's
Costs (Book Review), 80 YALE L.J. 647, 649-59 (1971). For an inquiry into whether strict
liability actually will produce safer products, see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
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cause would rid the legal world of proximate cause wherever that
noxious concept rears its heads, including negligence cases, and
limit the jury's role in all cases to determining cause in fact.1 5 The
more moderate Dean Prosser, so highly skilled at imposing order
on a wilderness of cases, knew he had seen the abyss when he faced
the mysteries and miseries of Moby Dick:
There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has
called forth more disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in
such a welter of confusion. Nor, despite the manifold attempts
which have been made to clarify the subject, is there yet any gen-
eral agreement as to the best approach.'
In 1945, Justice Traynor misspoke when he said that "[i]n all
probability the general expectation is the reasonable one that in
time the courts will dispel the mists that have settled on the doc-
135-42 (2d ed. 1977). See Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian
Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85
HARv. L. REV. 537 (1972) for noneconomic theories for strict tort liability.
For extensive readings on economic and other approaches to the analysis of tort law, see
R. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW (2d ed. 1983).
15. E.g., Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational Alloca-
tion of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 1 (naming those few courts
that have eliminated proximate cause and have substituted the duty-risk approach). The
late Wayne Thode, as he indicated in his article, was a vigorous disciple of the late Dean
Leon Green. Green in the 1920's began his fifty-year generalship in the battle against proxi-
mate cause. This Article represents my effort to be a good Green soldier. For more on Green
and his noble cause, see infra notes 30, 31. Other Green-inspired warriors include Maleson,
supra note 6; Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956); Pedrick,
supra note 13.
16. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 263 (5th ed. 1984). In proxi-
mate cause opinions, Florida judges occasionally cite this selection from Prosser or else draft
their own acknowledgement of proximate cause's slipperiness. See, e.g., Stahl v. Metropoli-
tan Dade County, 438 So. 2d 14, 17 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Rosen v. Parkway Gen. Hosp., 265
So. 2d 93, 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972) ("Proximate cause is a slippery legal concept."); Pope v.
Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co., 120 So. 2d 227, 230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960), cert. denied, 127 So.
2d 441 (Fla. 1961).
Dean Prosser, in Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 32 (1953), almost threw off the
chains of tort tradition to become a Green convert to a world without proximate cause:
Direct causation, the scope of the risk, the unforeseeable plaintiff, the last human
wrongdoer, the distinction between cause and condition, limitations of time and
space, substantial factors, natural and probable consequences, mechanical systems
of multiple rules, and all the rest of the rigmarole of 'proximate cause,' all have
been tried and found wanting in situations that inevitably arise to which they do
not and cannot provide a satisfactory solution. There is no substitute for dealing
with the particular facts, and considering all the factors that bear on them, inter-
locked as they must be. In this respect Leon Green has been for a quarter of a
century a voice crying in the wilderness; and as one of the original scoffers at his
doctrine, I make him belated obeisence [sic].
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trine of proximate cause in the field of negligence. "17 That the
mists persist in Florida law is evident in the sampling of cases ana-
lyzed in this Article. The Florida Supreme Court, like Dean Pros-
ser, has conceded that the concept of proximate cause "can be
quite difficult" and is "[m]ore easily defined than applied."" An-
other Florida court, in a fit of candor, once let the entire proximate
cause cat out of the bag:
It is notorious that proximate cause is in most cases what the
courts will it to be and that it is at best a theory under which the
courts justify liability or shield from liability those that the courts
find should not in reason and logic be responsible for a given
result.' 9
Yet, despite the widespread recognition of the unnecessary con-
fusion caused by traditional causation doctrines, proximate cause
is today, like the joker in poker, wild in aces, straights, and
flushes.20 It is little wonder that critics of the fictions and subter-
fuges of legal orthodoxy so often hit home, 21 given such easy
targets as the sham-scientific tests for proximate cause.22 Regretta-
17. Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 157 P.2d 372, 377 (Cal. 1945) (Traynor, J., concurring).
18. Asgrow-Kilgore Co. v. Mulford Hickerson Corp., 301 So. 2d 441, 444 (Fla. 1974).
19. Mozer v. Semenza, 177 So. 2d 880, 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965). Mozer involved a hotel
fire lit by an arsonist whom the defendant hotel claimed was an independent intervening
cause. The Mozer court correctly identified the causation issue as a nonfactual policy matter
("who done it" was clear) of choosing between the hotel owner's liability or immunity. But
the court's language in Mozer about proximate cause being a matter of the scope of the
hotel owner's duty would of course be inappropriate in a case where the dispute is about
"who done it," a matter that calls for drawing inferences from sensory perceptions about
history. For a recent Florida case attempting to dispel some of the mists and to separate
proximate cause into its two separate parts, see Stahl, 438 So. 2d at 19. The Stahl court,
like the court in Mozer, recognized that the proximate cause issue, in situations where cause
in fact is obvious, is a matter of drawing policy lines: "[C]ourts ... have found no proxi-
mate cause in such cases based solely on fairness and policy considerations, rather than [on]
actual causation grounds." Id.; see also Note, Medical Malpractice and "Loss of a Chance"
Actions- What Standard Should Florida Adopt?, 13 STETSON L. REv. 136, 139 n.31 (1983)
("Causation in fact poses the question whether the plaintiff was injured and, if so, whether
the defendant caused the injury .... [Clausation in law requires the court to determine
whether any legal consequences should be imposed." (footnote omitted)).
20. For a short critique of the tendency of judges faced with policy choices to lean on
confusing causation doctrines, see Vinson, Proximate Cause Fog Spreads, 69 A.B.A. J. 1042
(1983).
21. See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kairys ed. 1982); G. CALABREsi, A COMMON LAW
FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 175-76 (1982) ("[T]oo much. . . [linguistic inaccuracy about the
frequent fiction of legislative intent] by courts destroys their credibility, especially since the
major effective control on courts stems precisely from their duty to explain what they are
doing.").
22. Causation scientists don smocks and go to the lab, if one believes what one reads in
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bly, proximate cause has slipped not only into important areas of
tort law, such as strict products liability and ultrahazardous activi-
24 25ties, 23 but also into constitutional law,24 tax law, criminal law,"
and securities law.2 7 The Florida Supreme Court, in Lumbermens
Mutual Casualty Co. v. Castagna,28 even spied proximate cause
lurking in so unlikely a place as the Florida Motor Vehicle No-
Fault Law,29 a law designed to free traffic victims from common
law defenses to compensation.
What all this means is that the legal system needs a trained
watchdog to keep proximate cause out of compensation plans tied
to policies inconsistent with negligence law goals. If law is to be the
continual striving for reason it is cracked up to be, that reason
must be freed of excessive entanglement" with Latin maxims such
the law reports, to measure time and space; to test for efficiency and for cracks in the chain
of causation; to weigh for substantiality; to examine microscopically for activeness; and from
this data to form a hypothesis as to foreseeability.
23. Maleson, supra note 6; Polelle, supra note 6; Thode, supra note 15, at 11-12. But see
Note, supra note 6 (foreseeability standard approved).
24. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 307 (1936).
25. See generally Bayles, Tort Law Concepts Invade the Decision Process of Tax De-
duction Cases, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 35.
26. See M.C.J. v. State, 444 So. 2d 1001, 1004-05 (Fla. 1st DCA), petition for review
denied, 451 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1984); J.A.C. v. State, 374 So. 2d 606, 606-07 (Fla. 3d DCA
1979), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 1980).
27. See Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1028 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940
(1977), noted in 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 482 (1978), entitled For Fraud To Be "In Connec-
tion With" a Purchase or Sale of Securities Under Section 10(B), Plaintiffs Must Allege a
Causal Connection and Close Degree of Proximity Between the Purchase or Sale of Securi-
ties and Defendants' Fraudulent Scheme.
28. 368 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1979). For a discussion as to how proximate cause became in-
volved in the Lumbermens litigation, see infra text accompanying notes 111-24.
29. FLA. STAT. § 627.730-.7405 (1983). For review of the Act's impact during its early
years, see Little, No-Fault Auto Reparation in Florida: An Empirical Examination of Some
of Its Effects, 9 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 1 (1975).
30. See Green, The Thrust of Tort Law Part I: The Influence of Environment, 64 W.
VA. L. REv. 1, 15 (1961) ("The environment of today struggles to break through the doctrinal
overcast of yesterday."). Green was one of the early group of legal realists who in the 1920's
showed how inadequate legal language is for describing what judges and juries actually do.
If you read much of Green's work, you soon realize that legal literature has its own Moby
Dick. Dean Green's harpoons still draw blood from his great white nemesis:
Having no integrated meaning of its own, [proximate cause's] chameleon quality
permits it to be substituted for any one of the elements of a negligence case when
decision on that element becomes difficult .... No court that takes refuge in
"proximate cause" can ever be convicted of error except by a higher court that
does likewise .... No other formula . . .so nearly does the work of Aladdin's
lamp.
Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law (pts. 1-4), 28 TEx. L. REv. 471, 471-72
(1950) [hereinafter cited as Green, Proximate Cause].
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as proxima causa .3  As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. said, "To rest
upon a formula is a slumber that, prolonged, means death. 32
Whittling proximate cause down to a manageable, cause-in-fact
size will never be easy, for proxima causa has "captured the imagi-
nation of the courts, and by its promise of easy decision has led
them upon evil days. '3 3 Those who seek to paper over cracks in the
rule of law have been lured over the past century into the shifting
sands of causes proximate, sole, active, direct, immediate, legal 3
causa causans, causa sine qua non, effective, continuing, operative,
independent, concurring, intervening novus actus interveniens, effi-
cient, controlling, producing, procuring, preponderating, responsi-
ble, just, substantial, material, appreciable, subsequent, super-
vening, superceding, dependent, remote, passive, indirect,
consequential, sole proximate, independent intervening, interven-
ing independent supervening, and so forth. 5 For the cause in fact
of this avalanche of causation adjectives, we have the English bar
to thank.
In 1810,30 proxima causa slipped quietly into England's tort law
31. Lord Bacon's first "Maxim of the Law" was In jure non remota causa, sed proxima,
spectatur-a caution against misty generalities and uncertain speculation. Bacon was hop-
ing for law tied to reason, but instead he got a misty proxima causa that had grown, by the
time Dean Leon Green took up arms, into a whale of a fog. For half a century, Green dis-
sected proximate cause cases to reveal that the causation formulas of negligence law are too
empty of meaning to bear the burdens that judges continue to assign. When I was one of
Dean Green's students in 1957 at the University of Texas Law School, he emphasized the
hollowness of proximate cause rhetoric by forbidding mention of the noxious phrase in his
classroom. Students reciting cases in Green's classes referred to the unmentionable proxi-
mate cause in Greenspeak, i.e., either as a problem of "causal relation" or of "scope of
duty," depending on which of proximate cause's two faces appeared that day in the
casebook. Just before Green died at 90, the Texas Law Review filled its February 1978 issue
with guest articles dedicated to Green's war against the demon cause. That dedication issue
also lists Dean Green's published proof of Moby Dick's sins, including works such as L.
GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927); L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930); L. GREEN,
THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW (1965).
32. O.W. HOLMES, Ideals and Doubts, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 303, 306 (1920).
33. Green, Proximate Cause, supra note 30, at 471. Dean Green's anti-proximate cause
crusade was all the more noble since he must have known that stamping out proximate
cause in toto would be akin to removing from professionally-pitched baseballs that last tell-
tale trace of tobacco-brown spit.
34. "Legal" is the key adjective in Florida's causation jurisprudence. Florida's standard
jury instructions for negligence cases substitute for proximate cause the words "legal cause,"
apparently on the theory that a rose by any other name hides the thorns that impale reason.
FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES 5.1 (1967); see Note, Tests of Causa-
tion and the Florida Jury Instructions- The Current Conflict and the Need for a Change,
32 U. FLA. L. REV. 308 (1980).
35. This list of adjectives was compiled 35 years ago. Green, Proximate Cause, supra
note 30, at 472 n.2a.
36. In philosophy, a first-century poet traced the chain of causation to an earlier date:
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in a horse-and-buggy accident case entitled Flower v. Adam.3 7 In
Flower, Judge Lawrence opined that "the immediate and proxi-
mate cause [of the accident was] the unskilfulness of the [plaintiff]
driver. '3 8 Lawrence's words, at the simplest level, could be read as
a mere description of the accident. But simple description was not
Lawrence's aim. In Flower, the plaintiff's driving clearly was con-
nected to the accident; Lawrence, alas, was talking about who-
should-pay.
Lawrence no doubt knew his "proximate cause" had a face of
fault, yet he hardly could have realized the nature of the animal he
had created. Certainly there was nothing unique then or now about
referring to a party at fault as the blameworthy cause of an injury.
Only later did defense lawyers and easy-to-seduce judges develop
proximate cause's blameworthy side into a potent defense against
plaintiffs seeking broader protection under the negligence theory. 9
The proximate cause concept in post-Flower America perhaps met
a felt need for some means-often a judge finding insufficient evi-
dence of proximate cause-of limiting the scope of this new nine-
teenth-century fault theory of liability. ° The negligence tort
lacked the built-in liability limitations implicit in the specific ele-
ments of intentional torts. Moreover, when a defendant's conduct
is merely faulty rather than malicious or intentional, pressure
builds to draw a liability line commensurate with the lesser degree
of sin.
But the time has come for social engineers to lay aside causation
mechanics and openly shape compensation schemes according to
shared notions of fairness, deterrence, economics, morality, and
courthouse administration. Ridding the law of some of its proxi-
mate cause baggage might even lessen the more general legal con-
fusion about the whole law-fact distinction and the proper role of
the jury.
"Even from the first beginnings of the world descends a chain of causes." LUCAN, DE BELLo
CIVILI VI, 1.611.
37. 127 Eng. Rep. 1098 (1810). For discussions of the origins of proximate cause, see L.
GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 132-85 (1927); D. MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF
THE LAW 370- 83 (1963); Green & Smith, Negligence Law, No-Fault, and Jury Trial-l, 50
TEx. L. REV. 1297, 1299-1305 (1972).
38. Flower, 127 Eng. Rep. at 1100.
39. Green, Proximate Cause, supra note 30, at 473.
40. Thode, supra note 15, at 11.
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IV. THE JURY AND PROXIMATE CAUSE
According to the law, proximate cause is a question of fact for
the jury. To understand what this means, note that in law, "fact"
isn't really fact. "Fact," in point of fact and law, is often pure non-
fact. In plain English the truth is that, among lawyers, "[b]y and
large the terms 'law' and 'fact' are merely short terms for the re-
spective functions of judge and jury."4 ' Or, as a champion of com-
mon sense about the basic law-fact distinction put it, "whether a
particular question is to be treated as a question of law or a ques-
tion of fact is not in itself a question of fact, but a highly artificial
question of law." 2 Thus a jury queried on the "fact" issue of legal
cause may face either: (a) what-happened choices tied to conflict-
ing sensory evidence about a slice of history; or (b) who-should-
pay choices concerning political-ethical-sociological-economic val-
ues that bring into the courtroom everything that tugs on the
human conscience, including the values of stability and predict-
ability; or (and here comes the fog) (c) choices involving both (a)
and (b).4 s
Were lawyerly talk of esoteric causes to go out of style and refer-
ences to cause be always wedded to cause in fact, the expressions
"proximate" and "remote" and "efficient" could be dropped and
the sun would shine. Even the Janus-headed concept of proximate
cause could be tolerated (assuming we wish to acknowledge the
jury's legislative role) if the bar could keep separate the is from the
ought." But far too often, officers of the court speak of cause-in-
fact when the issue calls for discretionary choice among competing
values. Lawyer and judge often either fail to recognize the real is-
sue or, by using causation techniques, elect to view the law through
41. L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 279 (1930); see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 545-
56 (3d ed. 1972).
42. Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 11- 12 (1922); see Pedrick,
supra note 13, at 657.
43. Vinson, Torts In a Devil's Nutshell, 21 J. LEGAL EDUC. 430, 432-33 (1969), reprinted
in STUDENT L.J., May 1969, at 14, 16-18.
44. That the lack of such a separation of the is and the ought in proximate cause litiga-
tion causes considerable confusion is clear. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 42, at 272-73 (5th ed. 1984). Florida courts likewise recognize that the causation
issue has a double aspect. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Miami Burglar Alarm Co., 339 So. 2d 175,
177 (Fla. 1976); Courtney v. American Oil Co., 220 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968), cert.
denied, 225 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1969). In Courtney, the court states that "[tihe concept of
proximate cause has at least two functions. One is to require a causal connection between an
alleged act of negligence and [an injury]. The other is to limit the liability of the alleged
wrongdoer .... " Id. at 677. The perennial problem, however, is keeping legal eyes trained
on the proper ball at the proper time.
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a glass darkly.
Even were legal eagles able simultaneously to juggle both proxi-
mate cause balls, what about juries asked to fish the murky deep
for sin-laden causes? If juries are to choose, albeit intuitively, com-
pensatory goals, why seek out learned lawyers and give them robes.
On the other hand, in those few cases in which the cause-in-fact
aspect of proximate cause is disputed,45 resolution of such what-
happened disputes is proper jury work. But even in cause-in-fact
disputes, the standard legal cause instruction given juries is so gar-
bled that it fails to isolate for jurors the what-happened issue.46
Take, for example, Florida's standard jury instruction on legal
cause in negligence cases: "Negligence is a legal cause of [injury] if
it directly and in natural and continuous sequence produces or
contributes substantially to producing such [injury], so that it can
reasonably be said that, but for the negligence, the [injury] would
not have occurred. ' 47 Suppose a Florida trial judge believes there
to be a jury issue on cause in fact (for example, and hypothetically,
did Shane's wagon hit Master Jones, or did Jones break his leg
breakdancing?). The judge has little choice but to instruct the jury
in terms of "natural" and "directly. '48 Yet such vague adjectives
necessarily beg the political question and frustrate any effort to
focus jury attention on any disputed history.
If what-happened is in question, it is nonsense to ask jurors to
contemplate the mysteries of legal (who-should-pay) cause. A per-
ceptive juror given learned advice about "natural" and "legal"
cause, in a case where only what-happened is in question, must
tremble at the uncommon ways of the common law. One wonders if
literal-minded jurors might grapple seriously with the philosophi-
cal intricacies of whether a dog harnessed to a wagon is a "natural"
dog. Was Shane in harness any less a cause in fact of Jones' injury
because "natural" dogs pull no toy wagons?
45. Pedrick, supra note 13, at 646; Thode, supra note 15, at 7.
46. Thode, supra note 15, at 12-13.
47. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES 5.1(a) (1967) (emphasis
added).
48. See, e.g., Clooney v. Geeting, 352 So. 2d 1216, 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (awarding
new trial for failure to give standard instruction on concurring cause); Little v. Miller, 311
So. 2d 116, 118-19 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (error to refuse standard instruction on concurring
cause); Ruiz v. Cold Storage & Insulation Contractors, Inc., 306 So. 2d 153, 154-55 (Fla. 2d
DCA) (awarding new trial for failure to give standard instruction on concurring cause), cert.
denied, 316 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1975). For an excellent discussion of the competing tests for
cause in fact among Florida courts and for a proposed jury instruction limited to the cause-
in-fact inquiry, see generally Note, supra note 34.
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"Natural," in the context of personal injury suits, is alien to the
world of physical fact; "natural" is of the world of judgment. Con-
cepts such as "direct" and "natural" evoke the accordian like no-
tion of foreseeability, a triple-duty word Florida courts use to ra-
tionalize choices made about issues of proximate cause or
negligence or duty." If, therefore, a Florida juror faced with a
cause-in-fact issue were so unlucky as to remember the learned in-
struction on legal cause, such a juror should keep it to herself and
avoid confusing the other jurors.
A second problem with Florida's jury instruction on causation is
that jurors are never told that the search for "legal" cause, in cases
void of a cause-in-fact issue, is a sub rosa procedure for choosing
the scope of a negligent defendant's liability. Manipulating juries
into unconsciously sharing with judges the power to set liability
limits is a peculiar way to run a government.50 And then there's
the trial judge faced with a proximate cause verdict he can not live
with. This judge, in order to veto the jury's causation finding, must
tell the wrongheaded jurors that "reasonable minds" could never
have drawn such inferences from the evidence.
Equally peculiar is the posture appellate judges often assume
when reviewing proximate cause verdicts. Most such appeals con-
cern scope of liability, yet judges routinely test these proximate
cause verdicts by pretending that cause in fact is on review and by
incongruously screening testimony for substantial evidence of who
did what to whom. This pretense about empirical evidence is made
necessary by the underlying fiction that juries decide only what-
happened. For judges explicitly to review the unspoken policy
choices underlying a jury's verdict would fly in the face of a legal
theology that preaches that only judges shape law and policy.
The Florida Supreme Court, in Eli Witt Cigar & Tobacco Co. v.
Matatics, pretended that cause in fact was the sole issue and
avoided meaningful review of a scope of liability question. The
Matatics opinion reveals that the plaintiff, three weeks after suf-
fering a brain concussion in a highway collision with the defen-
49. Stevens v. Jefferson, 436 So. 2d 33, 35 (Fla. 1983) (foreseeable risk); Cone v. Inter
County Tel. & Tel. Co., 40 So. 2d 148, 149 (Fla. 1949); Sharon v. Luten, 165 So. 2d 806, 809
(Fla. 1st DCA 1964) (stating that natural and probable consequences are those which a pru-
dent person can be expected to anticipate).
50. See Bayles, supra note 25, at 48; Wells v. City of Vancouver, 467 P.2d 292, 296
(Wash. 1970) (Finley, J., concurring).
51. 55 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1951).
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dant, became dizzy at home and fell off a ladder.6 2 The jury gave
the plaintiff damages for his postcollision ladder fall. 3 On appeal,
the defendant argued that, under the foreseeable test for proxi-
mate cause laid down in Cone v. Inter County Telephone & Tele-
graph Co.,54 the plaintiff's dizzy fall, coming so long after the pri-
mary accident, was a risk, though attributable to the earlier
accident, that the plaintiff should himself bear.55
The supreme court's answer, however, spoke neither to foresee-
ability nor to scope of liability. Instead the justices pretended the
dispute centered solely on whether the plaintiff's earlier concussion
contributed to his dizzy fall from the ladder:
[W]e do not think [Cone] is applicable to a determination of the
particular question of whether the plaintiffs dizzy spells were
caused by the brain concussion . . . .We think that such evi-
dence [of factual connection] fairly warranted an inference of
proximate cause and effect between the brain concussion and the
dizzy spells . . .5
The Matatics court stated correctly-albeit irrelevantly-that
Cone's "foreseeability" is inapplicable to cause-in-fact disputes.
But of course the defendant cited Cone to bolster an argument for
restricting liability, a debate over policy that the Matatics opinion
sidestepped. Today, similar evasive tactics are being played by the
Florida Supreme Court in strict liability cases, and the fog
thickens.
V. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND COMMON LAW TINKERING
Where tort litigation involving strict liability has a statutory
52. Id. at 550.
53. Id.
54. Cone, 40 So. 2d 148, 149 (Fla. 1949). Cone involved a negligence suit brought by the
telephone company for injury to its employee caused by an exploding gasoline truck. The
employee was sent to the scene-of a collision to repair company lines damaged as a result of
the accident. The collision had occurred a half hour earlier and involved the defendant's
negligent collision with a gasoline truck. The court, reversing a verdict for the plaintiff,
ruled no proximate cause existed as a matter of law and stated that
when the loss is not a direct result of the negligent act ... land does not follow]
in natural ordinary sequence fron [sic] such act but is merely a possible, as distin-
guished from a natural and probable, result of the negligence, recovery will not be
allowed .... "Natural and probable" consequences are those which a person by
prudent human foresight can be expected to anticipate ....
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
55. Matatics, 55 So. 2d at 550-51.
56. Id. at 551.
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base, proximate cause is not the only language problem. Another
problem is the law's inadequate vocabulary for making sense out of
the way courts must deal with legislative acts. Lawyers, hemmed in
by the law's closed language system, can talk legally about few sub-
jects, and as to those only in limited ways. Legal language, for ex-
ample, has no way to talk about love or poetry, and that is perhaps
as it should be. But in the case of statutory interpretation, the
law's inability to step outside its language and examine itself criti-
cally is a weakness. A judge's job, the law says-and says little else
on the subject of reading statutes-is to follow the legislature's
bidding, as if it were a matter of following the Yellow Brick Road.
The rules of statutory construction, much like causation lore,
serve in substantial measure merely to screen judges from account-
ability. If rules like "statutes in derogation of the common law
should be strictly (or is it liberally?) construed" ever had teeth,
they have long since been worn down. Florida's dog statute cases
reflect the poverty endemic in judicial administration of statutes.
Traditional talk about statutory construction is so shut off from
reality that many lawyers perceive only dimly that the elaborate
attention legal writers give to notions of legislative intent is Wizard
of Oz stuff. Furthermore, were judicial deceit deemed a crime,
combining proximate cause chants and sleight of hand about legis-
lative intent would be compounding a felony. The Jones opinion,
for instance, shows justices reading section 767.01, in causation's
weak light, far too simplistically.
As Guido Calabresi argues in his newest book, A Common Law
for the Age of Statutes,7 we need a new theory for the role of
courts in interpreting legislative acts. Certainly the traditional the-
ory of judicial obsequiousness to legislative supremacy 8 does poor
service in describing the actual relationship between judge and leg-
islature in the daily application of legislative prescriptions. As is
well known, legislative supremacy is a sometimes thing; a clean
separation of power between judge and legislature takes place
rarely. Judges have long shared or even dominated the legislative
process (with or without the excuse of a constitutional power of
judicial review). As Calabresi puts it, "the development of theories
and practices of judicial interpretation of statutes. . . would make
even the proverbial Jesuit blush if they were viewed as attempts to
57. G. C AJABsi, supra note 21, at 7.
58. See R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 7-8 (1975).
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discern any kind of legislative intent."59
Florida's dog statute is just the sort of law that Calabresi had in
mind in proposing judicial updating of obsolete statutes.6 0 Cala-
bresi suggests that statutes (such as section 767.01) that are out of
step with the whole legal landscape" l be overhauled by a common
law process of renovation. Such a judicial revamping would be de-
rived from common law sources or from relevant statutory materi-
als; in this way rusty statutory parts would be replaced by
courts-where legislatures have neglected to revisit old haunts-in
the heat of litigation."
During one period in the life of Florida's dog statute, something
close to Calabresi's suggested common law renovation was at-
tempted. In Smith v. Allison,"3 the Third District Court of Appeal
denied section 767.01 protection to a plaintiff motorcyclist who
crashed trying to avoid a dog in the road. The court turned away
from absolute dog owner liability and concluded that an anti-dog
reading of section 767.01 might have fit the needs of an agrarian
society but that today's needs are different.6 4
Likewise, in a Fourth District dog bite case, the court empha-
sized the desirability'of reading section 767.01 restrictively with re-
gard to personal injury liability "because the legislature never spe-
cifically included damage to persons."6 5 Thus did the Fourth
District rewrite section 767.01 to fit cities rather than farms. Such
also was the common law approach of the district court that re-
59. G. CALABREsi, supra note 21, at 1. One such "blushworthy" practice of interpretation
is the proximate cause method used in the dog cases described herein.
60. Similar to this Article's proposal that judges come out from behind proximate cause
and squarely confront no-fault policy issues, Calabresi would remove the curtain of legisla-
tive intent where statutes are afflicted with "legal obsolesence" and permit judges to reno-
vate statutes the common law way, by judicial revision.
61. It is difficult to imagine that § 767.01, as interpreted in Jones, would receive legisla-
tive endorsement today. More importantly, in terms of legal obsolescence (Calabresi's term),
§ 767.01 as written today is supported by no legislative enactment, either in 1881 or thereaf-
ter, providing protection for "persons." See supra note 3.
Following an earlier compilation in which the compiler added "persons" to the act's list of
beneficiaries, the 1901 legislature rewrote its dog law (chapter 4979) to again protect not
"persons," but "sheep or other domestic animals." And once again, in a 1906 compilation
(section 3142), the dog statute's list of beneficiaries included "persons."
Under Florida's practice relating to statutory reenactments, the authenticity of the cur-
rent reference to "persons" in § 767.01 cannot be attacked.
62. G. CALABRESI, supra note 21, at 2; see supra note 60.
63. 332 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
64. Id. at 633; see supra notes 3, 60.
65. Wendland v. Akers, 356 So. 2d 368, 369 n.5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied, 378
So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1979).
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viewed dog Shane's misfortune, resulting in that court's short-lived
ruling that Shane's owner was outside section 767.01's strict liabil-
ity reach.66
By contrast, the supreme court in Jones resisted a reading of
section 767.01 to make it fit the current legal landscape. Shane
done it, period. Such a mechanical reading of section 767.01 gives
urgency to Calabresi's plea for a new age of judicial accommoda-
tion of outmoded statutes to contemporary life. Calabresi says
"[tlhe choice must be for candor ' 67 in revealing the partnership
role judges play in making workable the necessarily tentative ef-
forts of legislators.
In Jones, the supreme court opted for causation dogma, always a
temptation in difficult cases in which no "rhyme or reason "68
springs readily to mind. Thus do judges push into the background
their "creative role in statutory interpretation." 9 Thus do judges
punt the ball toward the jury box by creating "fact" questions such
as proximate cause. And as for section 767.01, Florida law superim-
poses proximate cause's mockery of "rhyme or reason" on top of
the statute's inherent ambiguities. The result, as the cases de-
scribed below show, is, for reasons never clarified, strict-with-a-
vengeance dog owner liability.
VI. PROXIMATE DOGS AND STRICT LIABILITY
Since (blameworthy) proximateness, like beauty, is in the eye of
the beholder, who-should-pay can only be worked out case by case
in that intuitive world below the level of language where hunches
about relative truth take form. Jones is but the latest in a line of
bizarre dog cases illustrating the folly of tying dog owner liability
to mechanical causation formulas. Two other dog cases, both sur-
prisingly tough on dog owners, show how, by carefully massaging
the cause concept, judges can avoid saying what they are doing and
why.
Brandeis v. Felcher70 is one such case, cited with approval by
66. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 408 So. 2d 769, 771-72 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), rev'd, 463
So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1985).
67. G. CALABREsi, supra note 21, at 177. "To deny what we are doing, to use tricks here,
is to destroy by overuse a language that is easily cheapened . Id. at 180.
68. Probert, supra note 9, at 390.
69. R. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE 82 (1969). "[Sluch refusal freezes reform....
In view of the ever increasing impact of inertia in legislatures, the effect in most cases is a
deep freeze." Id.
70. 211 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 219 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1968).
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the Florida Supreme Court in Jones.71 Defendant owners of mating
German shepherds placed their dogs inside a backyard chain link
fence. Children, passing by on the adjacent sidewalk, were fright-
ened when the barking shepherds charged the four-foot-high fence.
The children ran into the street, and the plaintiff's child was killed
by a passing car. The district court noted the dogs done it, period,
next case.
72
What the district court might have done, had it not tripped over
proximate cause, was first note that although a wide range of ca-
nine-related incidents can trigger section 767.01 liability,7 the
act's scope nevertheless has limits. 74 (A plaintiff who trips over a
sleeping dog, in violation of Dickens' command to "let sleeping
dogs lie," 76 surely deserves no section 767.01 succor.) The district
court next might have reflected on section 767.01's original aim of
livestock protection or even considered, along Calabresi's common
law lines, judicially updating the statute to meet contemporary
goals. The district court then might have judged the risk of injury
posed by the German shepherds too slight to deserve strict liability
treatment. Such judicial shaping of section 767.01 policy would
avoid ad hoc judgment by confused jurors, would put the responsi-
bility for the decision where it belongs, and would make judges ac-
countable for their policies.
The general problem in these dog cases is, of course, that the dog
statute, in contexts like Brandeis, is hopelessly vague. Whether the
Florida legislatures of 188176 or 190177 would have characterized
Brandeis' shepherds as having done statutory mischief is any-
71. 463 So. 2d at 1157.
72. 211 So. 2d at 609.
73. See supra note 3; Donner v. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 21, 23
(Fla. 1978).
74. The court in Jones, 463 So. 2d at 1156-57, stated:
We reject the view that the legislature intended strict liability for dog owners in
every instance where the actions of a dog are a factor in an injury. Clearly the
rules of ordinary causation should apply. Thus, an affirmative or aggressive act by
the dog is required ... [as distinguished from] cases in which the animal is
merely a passive instrumentality in a chain of events leading to injury.
75. C. DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD 443 (G. Ford ed. 1958). See Rutland v. Biel, 277 So.
2d 807 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973), in which a 76-year-old plaintiff, while visiting in her pastor's
home, heard a dog yelp. She looked down and saw the dog under her feet. Taking a step
backward, she tripped over the dog and fell. The trial judge favored strict liability at sum-
mary judgment, but the appellate court remanded, saying that in a situation where a dog
"takes no affirmative or aggressive action," let sleeping dogs lie. Id. at 809.
76. See supra note 3.
77. See supra note 60.
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body's guess.7s Despite such statutory guesswork, courts assume
that behind every statute there exists a binding legislative intent,
even though this notion of definitive intent is often little better
than a fairy tale. Legislative codes that might sink into chaos are
saved, however, because behind the metaphysical mysteries of in-
tent courts usually "find" an intent that fits practical needs.
Under the orthodox legislative intent approach, judges dig into
legislative history for clues or else fire canons of statutory con-
struction at the statute's looser phrases. What else is there? The
legal imagination fails to provide a vocabulary 79 for sensible talk
about the way judges must put new faces on old statutes. If things
get bad enough, there's always, as in Brandeis, proximate cause to
lean upon. The Brandeis court thus "uncomplicated" the statutory
coverage problem by phrasing the issue in cause-in-fact terms: Did
the German shepherds contribute to the child's fatal retreat into
the street? An affirmative answer may get the appeal off the
docket, but it doesn't explain why the dogs' owners ought to pay
section 767.01 damages. The cause-in-fact issue was fake.
In all fairness, however, the Brandeis court did not entirely
foresake an inquiry into legislative intent. The court's opinion re-
sponded to a preliminary issue by ruling for the plaintiff that both
bite and nonbite damages are "within the contemplation of the
statute."' 0 Oddly, however, it is only in this segment of the case
that the court measured the reach of "done by. . .dogs" by look-
ing to legislative intent. Inconsistently, the Brandeis court next,
despite having confessed to knowing what was "within the contem-
plation of the statute," refused to draw upon this knowledge in
deciding whether the German shepherds' owners fell within section
767.01's strict, nonbite, liability reach. Instead, the "done by"
Brandeis court concluded that the shepherds' owners had to pay
because section 767.01's plain cause-in-fact meaning so dictated.81
Under this reading of section 767.01, had Mrs. O'Leary's cow-the
78. Had the court in Brandeis seen its job as one of 4etermining the reach of § 767.01's
strict liability protection, then presumably the 1881 legislature's concern for protecting live-
stock and the accidental nature of the compiler's adding of "persons" as a § 767.01 benefi-
ciary would have pointed toward stopping liability short of the Brandeis facts.
79. See J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 229 (1973).
80. 211 So. 2d at 607.
81. "Deciding cases on grounds of 'plainness' also means deciding them without hard
thought about underlying policies, without recourse to that reasoned consideration and dis-
cussion of the substantive aspects of the problem which alone can provide a base for the law
to build on soundly and which alone permit rational prediction for the future." Kernochan,
Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of Method, 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 333, 344 (1976).
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one that knocked over the lantern that burned Chicago-been a
Miami dog, owner O'Leary would have had to buy Miami.
In the Brandeis appeal, who did what and to whom was undis-
puted. Brandeis' mating dogs, in the plain English sense of "fact,"
noisily charged the fence, conduct that clearly contributed to the
child's death. The real question was just how much of Miami must
a dog-burdened O'Leary buy. Yet so convoluted is causation jargon
that it was easy for the Brandeis court to dress up in factual cos-
tume the scope-of-liability issue raised by Brandeis' unusual cir-
cumstances. Under the Brandeis approach, the trier of fact must
search among barking dogs and speeding automobiles for some
"natural" and "legal" creature that swims around the edges of sec-
tion 767.01 and marks the circle of strict liability.
Florida's dog jurisprudence and other causation cases cited later
pose the question of why, if we wish to draw on a jury's common
sense in shaping no-fault policy, we handicap jurors with such un-
common devices as legal cause instructions. Rather, why not ask a
jury candidly for its advice, say, on 767.01 policy: "Do you, mem-
bers of the jury, believe that the defendant-owners of these Ger-
man shepherds ought to pay damages for the child's death?" Such
plain talk about who or what shapes tort law might disappoint the
brooding-omnipresence crowd. But in the long run, candor should
promote credibility in courtroom government.
The Brandeis opinion reveals that the district court itself, as is
often the case when causation debate generates fog, was confused
about what it was doing.82 For example, the court, in measuring
section 767.01's applicability, mentioned the "but for" test.83 "But
for," however, is out of place in Brandeis. Had the dog owners con-
tended in Brandeis that the children were frightened by hissing
snakes rather than barking dogs, then "but for" would be a logical
question.
The Brandeis court also discussed the substantial factor test for
cause in fact.84 But again, the cause-in-fact issue was a red herring.
Brandeis involved the much more complex problem of choosing
82. See Note, Dog Owner's Liability in Non-Bite Situations: Duty v. Cause-Barking
Up the Wrong Tree, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 848, 852-53 (1969): "It is this writer's opinion that
the [Brandeis] court ... confused proximate cause with duty .... Limitations of responsi-
bility should be based upon considerations of policy and not facts of causation."
83. 211 So. 2d at 607. For a discussion of the limited nature of the "but for" test, see
Thode, supra note 15, at 13-14, 23-26, 28.
84. 211 So. 2d at 608. See Thode, supra note 15, at 25 for discussion of the limited
nature of the "substantial factor" test.
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who-should-pay the costs of a fatal accident.85
Brandeis, moreover, by measuring section 767.01's coverage by a
proximate cause yardstick, creates a paradox. Section 767.01 is on
one hand a no-fault law. Yet when judges feed proximate cause
into a statutory no-fault system, disputes about coverage tend to
smack of foreseeability and remoteness and all the rest of proxi-
mate cause's negligence baggage. The effect of such fault baggage
ordinarily, though not in Brandeis,86 is to take the strictness out of
strict liability.
Of course, paradox and the law are longtime friends.8 7 And for
85. Dean Green's answer to this common confusion would be to restrict the causation
issue to cause in fact, reserving for the judge the resolution of competing economic, moral,
deterrent, and administrative factors which go into deciding liability issues. See supra note
31. The rub is in separating out the true cause-in-fact cases. Here the most common mistake
is to analyze cases involving an actor's failure to do something as raising a cause-in-fact
issue.
Consider, as an example of such judicial error, the recent Florida Supreme Court case of
Stevens v. Jefferson, 436 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1983). A widowed plaintiff sued a bar owner for the
death of her husband. The plaintiff's husband had been shot and killed in the defendant's
bar by a fellow patron. In Stevens, had the dispute been about which bar served the de-
ceased his last drink, the issue would have been true cause in fact. But cause in fact was not
at issue in Stevens; the problem instead involved whether legal consequences should be
imposed on the bar owner for failing to keep better order.
The supreme court nevertheless concluded that the case raised a jury issue of "legal cau-
sation"-whether the killing occurred because the bar lacked adequate security safeguards.
Id. at 35. Another way to pose the question as formulated by the court in Stevens is to ask,
hypothetically, would the deceased have lived to take another drink had the bar owner kept
better order? Such a hypothetical question, however, is essentially unanswerable because it
is about what-if, not what-happened. And asking what-if, because it involves speculation of
the rankest order, is at bottom necessarily to ask which actor, given the circumstances and
the unknowns, should pay for the loss. See Thode, The Indefensible Use of the Hypotheti-
cal Case to Determine Cause in Fact, 46 TEx. L. REV. 423 (1968).
86. Yet in Brandeis there is a second paradox. Although the function of proximate cause
in negligence cases usually is to cap liability, in cases such as Brandeis and Jones, courts
have focused solely on the cause-in-fact side of proximate cause, a one-eyed application of
proximate cause which gives § 767.01 an unusually broad reach.
87. For example, consider these newly discovered writings about the law found in a
rabbit hole out West:
(a) The law is a body of rules around the end of which lawyers, for money,
circumnavigate;
(b) Questions of fact are also questions of law, and vice versa, except when neither
is the other;
(c) Keepers of the common law are proud of their lawyerly language, which is why
they have forsaken English;
(d) The law is constantly being clarified and simplified, but law students must
study longer and harder;
(e) The rule of law works well except in instances where judges must clarify ambi-
guity, which is the case with statutes, common law, and constitutions;
(f) The common law, which is judicial rule based on precedent, has only a single
flaw: The absence of a rule defining precedent;
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opinion writers comfortable with causation conundrums, proximate
cause is user friendly. Accordingly, the Brandeis court and the
Florida Supreme Court in Jones"5 and Matatics9 punched the key
that momentarily erased the scope-of-liability side of proximate
cause, leaving only the easy-to-please, pro-plaintiff, "done by"
side.90 What is missing of course, in cases like Jones, is a straight-
forward discussion about how far to extend the statutory duty im-
posed on dog owners by section 767.01. 11
The 1968 Brandeis opinion is typical of the opinions which fol-
lowed in the 1970's invoking proximate cause as a measure of the
strictness of section 767.01.92 One of those cases, Mapoles v.
Mapoles,95 decided by a divided district court,94 initiated the de-
bate about the suitability of the Brandeis causation approach that
later would divide the supreme court in its 1984 decision in
Jones.9 5
Mapoles involved a nearly two-hundred-pound Saint Bernard
named Rueben96 who was placed in the backseat of a Volkswagen
that contained a loaded shotgun. Rueben sat down on the shotgun
and it discharged, severely injuring the plaintiff, who was standing
(g) Extracting legal precedent includes both expanding old cases beyond their
facts to cover new claims, and contracting old cases to their facts so as to exclude
new claims.
88. 463 So. 2d at 1153.
89. Eli Witt Cigar & Tobacco Co. v. Matatics, 55 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1951).
90. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Greenstein, 308 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), disap-
proved in Donner v. Awkright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1978). Pan-
dora, a Great Dane, escaped from his chain and ran into the street where he collided with
plaintiff's car. The court directed a verdict for the plaintiff under § 767.01 on the theory
that the act covered Pandora's owner because Pandora, rather than plaintiff's alleged sixty-
mile-per-hour driving, caused plaintiff to bounce off Pandora and into a power pole.
91. See, e.g., Smith v. Allison, 332 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), in which the same
district court that had one year earlier ruled Pandora the proximate cause had one year
later forgotten about causation theories and on similar facts (except that the dog in the
street did not collide with plaintiff's motorcycle) decided that § 767.01 fell short of protect-
ing the plaintiff.
92. E.g., Jones, 463 So. 2d at 1153; Mapoles v. Mapoles, 350 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 1st DCA
1977), cert. denied, 364 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1978); Allstate Ins. Co., 308 So. 2d at 561; Rutland,
277 So. 2d at 807; English v. Seachord, 243 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971), petition for
cert. dismissed, 259 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1972), disapproved in Donner v. Arkwright-Boston
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1978).
93. 350 So. 2d 1137.
94. Id. at 1138 (Smith, J., dissenting) (proposing a legislative intent approach to putting
boundaries around § 767.01).
95. 463 So. 2d at 1153. In Jones, two justices dissented. Justice Overton dissented with
an opinion rejecting the majority's proximate cause emphasis.
96. Telephone interview with T. Sol Johnson of Milton, Fla., Attorney for Plaintiff (June
7, 1984).
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near the car. 97 Suit under section 767.01 ensued, and the First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal voted 2-1 that Rueben "done" it and his
owner must pay.98
The Mapoles majority saw only a cause-in-fact issue. The major-
ity apparently assumed the policy reach of the dog statute extends
to Saint Bernards passively riding shotgun in backseats. So simple
was the issue for the majority, it saw no need for a jury: "If the
statute means what it says, the syllogism is clear: Cam was the
owner of the dog; damage was caused to a person by the dog; and
thus the owner of the dog is liable for the damage done."9
In dissent, Judge Robert Smith asserted that, since Rueben's
"dogness played no more a part than if the trigger had been jolted
by a cat or a falling sack of groceries," 00 surely the statutory pur-
pose would be ill-served by imposing dog owner liability. Smith
proposed that section 767.01 liability be imposed only if "the shot-
gun was fired as a result of canine characteristics for which the
legislature intended to make the owner an insurer."101
Five years after Mapoles, the Second District Court of Appeal,
in the initial appeal involving dog Shane and wagoner Jones, re-
jected the Mapoles majority's cause-in-fact reading of section
767.01.102 Instead, the district court, adopting Judge Smith's "ca-
nine characteristics" test, concluded that section 767.01 was
designed for purposes other than compensating victims of dog-
drawn toy wagons.103
When the Florida Supreme Court in Jones rejected Smith's "ca-
nine characteristics" test and reinstated near-absolute dog owner
liability, the court apologized for its proximate cause approach but
noted "the difficulty of fashioning a workable and administrable
alternative. '"104 The supreme court then approved Mapoles' one-
eyed, cause-in-fact version of section 767.01.10 5
97. Mapoles, 350 So. 2d at 1138.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1139 (Smith, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 1138 (Smith, J., dissenting).
102. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 408 So. 2d at 772.
103. Id. at 771-72. In addition, the court reviewed legislative history indicating that the
predecessors of § 767.01 were designed to protect agricultural interests. Id. at 771.
104. Jones, 463 So. 2d at 1156. The court failed to explain why it characterized as
"traditional" the use of causation doctrines drawn from negligence law in alien no-fault liti-
gation; nor is there a clue as to why the justices believed it desirable to allow the proximate
cause concept, which so many find so distasteful a part of the legal process in negligence
law, to escape from its ancestral home in the house of fault.
105. Id. at 1156.
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Proximate cause, as usual, thus winds up in the catbird seat,'0 6
and Florida justices remain "above the fray." The "canine charac-
teristics" test, wrote the supreme court, just won't do: "How is one
to determine whether or not an animal's behavior is sufficiently
. . . canine?' 10 7 One answer of course is to acknowledge ambiguity
in much of the legal world and to face up to the challenge such
ambiguity poses for the legal imagination. To say, as the Jones
court did, that Shane's "affirmative" act in towing the wagon was
part of the "natural and continuous sequence" which was a "but
for" cause of young Jones' injury'018 just won't do.
The point is that neither traditional causation law nor vague no-
tions like dogness can be the real stuff of decision. Verbal tests for
true causes or true dogness merely divert attention from the diffi-
cult policy choices which judge and jury must make. The power to
decide cannot be evaded. The law needs fewer magicians, more
managers.10 9
VII. FLORIDA MOTOR VEHICLE NO-FAULT LAW
What may be needed finally is a law outlawing proximate
cause." 0 Proximate cause's advance into the Florida Motor Vehicle
No-Fault Law,"' in Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Cas-
tagna,"' indicates, however, that it may take a constitutional
amendment to pry proximate fault out of no-fault law. Meanwhile,
Lumbermen's plaintiff, Ercole Castagna, has learned that causa-
tion is a double-edged sword.
Castagna was hurt when his business van collided with a lunch
truck. Just seconds before hitting Castagna, the lunch truck had
bounced off a Chevrolet passenger car." 3 Castagna's initial prob-
lem in collecting no-fault benefits was that Florida's no-fault law
106. Red Barber, in his radio broadcasts of major league baseball, used to say when team
A was leading team B, say nine-to-nothing in the ninth inning, that team A was in the
catbird seat.
107. 463 So. 2d at 1156.
108. Id. Justice Overton in dissent characterized Shane's dogged chase as neither a "di-
rect" nor an "affirmative" cause. Id. at 1158-59 (Overton, J., dissenting). The majority, how-
ever, was so sure of its causation adjectives that it saw no need for a jury and found proxi-
mate cause as a matter of law. Id. at 1158.
109. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 21, at 178-81.
110. See Venable, Proximate Causes and Effects, 19 Miss. L.J. 183 (1948).
111. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-.7405 (1983). For similar treatment of this issue by the au-
thor, see Vinson, supra note 20, at 1042.
112. 368 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1979).
113. Id. at 349.
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at that time excluded coverage of commercial vehicles;114 Cas-
tagna's van and the lunch truck were excluded commercial vehi-
cles. Since Florida's no-fault law extends benefits for injuries
"caused" by a noncommercial "motor vehicle,""'  Castagna looked
around for a noncommercial motor vehicle that "caused" his inju-
ries. He spied the Chevrolet passenger car off which the lunch
truck had bounced before hitting his van. So Castagna tied his no-
fault claim, ingeniously, to the "ricochet Chevy" that allegedly
"caused" his injuries.
The Florida Supreme Court in its Lumbermens opinion tenta-
tively agreed with Castagna that, if the Chevy "caused" his acci-
dent, he should collect no-fault benefits. Had the justices then read
the Act's "caused" the cause-in-fact way, Castagna would have col-
lected; clearly the Chevy was involved in Castagna's accident. "But
for" the once-removed Chevy's service as a springboard to propel
the lunch truck into his business van, Castagna would have es-
caped harm. 1 6
At this point, the Lumbermens court should have shunned fur-
ther dealings with causes, proximate or otherwise. "Caused" is too
ambiguous to help much in deciding which far-out auto no-fault
claims to give no-fault law protection. The underlying issue in
Lumbermens was, after all, whether the risk-spreading policies un-
derlying the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law justified ex-
tending the Act to Ercole Castagna's multi-vehicle collision.
But the supreme court declined to talk about risk-spreading. In-
stead the court announced that, when the legislature tied no-fault
liability to a "motor vehicle" that has "caused" injury, it must
have intended that judges and juries measure the act's protective
reach by "traditional tort concepts of causation."' 1 7 The supreme
114. The no-fault law's current definition of covered motor vehicles includes a "commer-
cial motor vehicle." FLA. STAT. § 627.732(1)(b) (1983).
115. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(4)(d)(1) (1983) (emphasis added) reads:
(d) The insurer of the owner of a motor vehicle shall pay personal injury protec-
tion benefits for:
1. Accidental bodily injury sustained in this state by the owner while occupying
a motor vehicle, or while not an occupant of a self-propelled vehicle if the injury is
caused by physical contact with a motor vehicle.
116. For a Florida auto no-fault case involving a real cause-in-fact issue, see American
States Ins. Co. v. Piasecki, 392 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (Was Piasecki hurt in traffic
accident or in battle with a gang of kids?).
117. Lumbermens, 368 So. 2d at 350. But cf. Arnold v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 425 So.
2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA) (distinguishing Lumbermens and relieving plaintiff-pedestrian of
proving that car A was the cause of injury where car A bounced off car B and was out of
control, and plaintiff fell down and hurt himself when a friend tried to push plaintiff out of
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court then sent Castagna back to a trial court jury to learn if the
once-removed Chevy "caused," in the blameworthy, metaphysical
sense of that word, Castagna's collision.
On remand, Castagna's jury decided as a matter of policy-
there was no other matter in dispute-that the "springboard
Chevy" present at the accident scene failed to justify extending no-
fault benefits to plaintiff Castagna. 11s Or to put it in traditional
terms: The jury decided that, because the "ricochet Chevy" was
unforeseeable way over there behind the foreseeable lunch truck,
the Chevy "caused" no injury and was disqualified as a covered
"motor vehicle."
Fairness to the state's high court demands that the finger of
fault for first injecting traditional causation into the Florida Motor
Vehicle No-Fault Law be pointed at the Third District Court of
Appeal. That district court, in 1975, four years before Lumber-
mens, injected proximate cause into Royal Indemnity Co. v. Gov-
ernment Employees Insurance Co." 9 Royal Indemnity settled
which of two insurers was to pay certain no-fault claims. The case
involved a two-car accident in which car A knocked car B into the
plaintiff victim, who was seated on a nearby bus bench. It was
judged that car A was the more blameworthy "motor vehicle" and
so for no-fault purposes "caused" the damage. 20 What is missing,
however, in Royal Indemnity is plain talk about scope of no-fault
liability and the role of the jury in shaping no-fault policy.
Plain English in such contents, as earlier discussed, is rare."'
Nowhere in the vast reaches of the common-or uncommon- law
is there a clear statement about a jury's role in allocating losses
suffered by accident victims. In Lumbermens, for example, clearly
car A's runaway path), petition for review denied, 437 So.2d 677 (Fla. 1983). Lumbermens
and Arnold involved claimants injured while not occupying covered vehicles, and so the no-
fault law condition that benefits be tied to a covered vehicle that "caused" injury applied. In
cases involving injury to occupants of covered vehicles, FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (1983) re-
quires only that the loss be one "arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a
motor vehicle." The Florida Supreme Court, in Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Novak,
453 So. 2d 1116, 1119 (Fla. 1984), recognized that "'arising out of' does not mean 'proxi-
mately caused by,' but has a much broader meaning. All that is required is some nexus
between the motor vehicle and the injury." The "nexus" in Novak, which the court deemed
adequate to trigger no-fault benefits, was that Beverly Ann Novak was sitting in her parked
car when she was shot to death by a stranger whose request for a ride she had just rejected.
Id. at 1117.
118. Telephone interview with Jerry Larotonda, Attorney for Ercole Castagna, Miami,
Fla. (Sept. 18, 1981).
119. 307 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
120. Id. at 460.
121. See supra notes 41-43.
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the jury legislated a policy for plaintiff Castagna's no-fault law
claim. Juries asked to weigh causes in multi-car collisions clearly
decide much more than what-happened. The "formal law descrip-
tion of the judicial process," wrote Jerome Frank, "is false where
juries are involved."' 22
It may be that passive judges who transfer to juries the power to
set no-fault policy may get decent verdicts. Lumbermens is a case
in point. Jurors, free of the obfuscations of legal learning, may
screen no-fault claims more wisely than judges bound in legalistic
knots. This depends, of course, on which jury and which judge and
on one's preferences about using no-fault insurance to spread (gen-
erally through plaintiff-minded juries) losses. The pity, however, is
that judges can't be more direct in managing juries and adminis-
tering statutes.
Despite legislative efforts to spread losses more widely through
no-fault plans, Lumbermens reminds us again that the lawyerly
habit of thinking in terms of fault dies slowly. Shifting accident
losses by seeking out proximate sinners likely will continue long
after no-fault codes replace, on paper, all negligence doctrines.
How can courts live with this paradox? The Lumbermens' opinion
shows how. First, the court noted that the no-fault law "was in-
tended to make an inquiry as to fault unnecessary."'' 2s Then, with-
out blinking, the justices loaded proximate cause and its century-
old accumulation of fault baggage onto the backs of future no-fault
claimants with borderline claims.'24
The nonsense represented by a proximate cause inquiry in con-
texts like Lumbermens once was underscored by the Mississippi
Supreme Court's effort to state in a single sentence the boundaries
of liability carved out by "traditional causation":
122. Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. REv. 645, 652-53 (1932).
123. Lumbermens, 368 So. 2d at 350.
124. Id.; contra Pestock v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 674 P.2d 1062, 1063 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1984) (auto no-fault statute covering claims "arising out of the . . . use of" automo-
biles "imparts a more liberal concept of causation than 'proximate cause' "); Berg v. Ohio
Casualty Ins. Co., 399 A.2d 675, 677 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (court, in no-fault case
involving pedestrian hit first by noncovered truck and then by covered car, rejected proxi-
mate cause: "Tort concepts are not pertinent .... The Legislature designed the [no-fault]
statute to (1) excise the fault concept. . . [and] (2) guarantee a certain minimum amount of
coverage . . . by shifting compensation from a tort insurance system .... "); but see De-
troit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Higginbotham, 290 N.W.2d 414, 419 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)
(husband in car rammed his wife's automobile and then shot her; court ruled that injury was
not one "arising out of the use of a motor vehicle" and not "foreseeably identifiable with the
normal use of a motor vehicle." (emphasis in original)).
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The area within which liability is imposed is that which is within
the circle of reasonable foreseeability using the original point at
which the negligent act was committed or became operative, and
thence looking in every direction as the semidiameters of the cir-
cle, and those injuries which from this point could or should have
been reasonably foreseen as something likely to happen, are
within the field of liability, while those which, although foresee-
able, were foreseeable only as remote possibilities, those only
slightly probable, are beyond and not within the circle,-in all of
which time, place and circumstance play their respective and im-
portant parts.12 5
During trials jurors must by law listen to judges go through simi-
lar law-in-discourse rituals. Afterwards, jurors can only ignore
these unintelligible descriptions of legal causation. 26 Such doctri-
nal trappings serve merely to facilitate the procedure by which
judges give to and take from juries the power of choosing where to
place accident losses. 12 7
The world of legal cause cannot escape the fact that it lacks sub-
stantive content. Foreseeability, the slender reed that supports the
world of fault as a triple-duty test for duty, negligence, and causa-
tion,128 is hollow. 2 9 Neither foreseeability nor its flip side, remote-
ness, no matter how intensely judge and jury strain to see into the
fog, can answer scope-of-protection questions such as those posed
by Lumbermens' springboard Chevrolet. Deciding whether a vehi-
cle located on the periphery of an accident warrants no-fault law
inclusion is not a matter of looking and seeing, but of choosing
values.
Another example of how Florida appellate judges get tangled up
in their elaborate variations on the causation theme is the 1985 no-
fault case of Hernandez v. Protective Casualty Insurance Co.'30 In
the district court, Jorge Hernandez lost his claim for personal in-
jury protection benefits.' 3' Hernandez was injured while police
were assisting him from his car after stopping him for a traffic vio-
lation. He claimed entitlement to no-fault protection since his in-
125. Mauney v. Gulf Ref. Co., 9 So. 2d 780, 781 (Miss. 1942).
126. See Frank, supra note 122, at 648-49, 652.
127. See Green, Proximate Cause, supra note 30, at 644-45.
128. See Ninth Survey of Florida Law (pt. 2), Torts, 24 U. MIAdi L. REv. 617, 632-35
(1970).
129. See Green, Proximate Cause, supra note 30, at 772.
130. 10 Fla. L.W. 297 (Fla. May 30, 1985).
131. Protective Casualty Ins. Co. v. Hernandez, 450 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
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jury arose "out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor
vehicle." 132 The district court, however, followed the Lumbermens
brand of proximate cause and ruled as a matter of law that Her-
nandez's police-aided injury was an unforeseeable consequence of
driving a car and therefore not a statutory injury "arising out of
the use . . . of a motor vehicle."' 33 The supreme court reversed,
holding that Hernandez, unlike plaintiff Castagna in Lumbermens,
was entitled to no-fault benefits despite the lack of foreseeable
proximity between Hernandez's use of an automobile and his in-
jury at the hands of the police.3 4
According to the supreme court, Hernandez's claim should have
been measured by one kind of causation and Castagna's by an-
other. The court's basis for this distinction is dubious. Driver Her-
nandez sued for no-fault coverage as an occupant of a covered mo-
tor vehicle under section 627.736(1),1a1 which protects against
injury "arising out of" use of such a motor vehicle. Castagna, driv-
ing an un-covered business vehicle, keyed on the ricochet Chevro-
let and sued as a nonoccupant (of the Chevrolet) under section
627.763(4)(d)(1), which protects against injury "caused by physical
contact" with a motor vehicle. Normal readers of legislative prose,
readers unafflicted with proximate cause myopia, would assume
that the legislature intended to treat similarly occupants ("arising
out of") and nonoccupants ("caused by physical contact"). The
most reasonable inference is that the legislature expressed more or
less the same idea in these two contexts, using slightly different
combinations of words in order to make syntactical sense. Only if
one assumes that the drafters of the Florida No-Fault Law were
proximate cause lawyers writing exclusively for proximate cause
judges, can one concur in the supreme court's Hernandez reading
of these two no-fault sections. The supreme court concluded that
the "arising out of" language requires occupant claimants to show
only "some nexus" between car and injury. The "caused by physi-
cal contact" language, on the other hand, requires nonoccupant
claimants to run the obstacle course of proximate cause.136 The
court's only explanation for treating no-fault claimants Hernandez
132. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (1983).
133. 450 So. 2d at 865-66.
134. Hernandez, 10 Fla. L.W. at 298.
135. See supra note 115.
136. Hernandez, 10 Fla. L.W. at 298. The court first articulated this distinction in No-
vak, 453 So. 2d 1116. Novak was decided after the district court in Hernandez denied no-
fault coverage on a proximate cause basis.
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and Castagna differently was to quote its Lumbermens rationale:
"We think by inserting the word 'caused' in the statute, the legisla-
ture plainly intended [the proximate cause concept from negli-
gence law] would be a factor to be considered. 13 7
If, in fact, the legislature "plainly intended" to give plaintiff
Hernandez the easier "some nexus" route to no-fault recovery, the
court's 4-3 split in Hernandez is surprising. Hernandez, after all,
was literally "arising out of" his car when he was hurt. The trouble
is, of course, both "arising out of" and "caused" are equally riddled
with ambiguity. Thus, when questionable claims arise under the
no-fault law, whether under section 627.736(1) or 627.736(4)(d)(1),
that call for defining the scope of protection to be given traffic vic-
tims, all the fine-tuned appellate talk of "nexus" and "foreseeable"
and "proximate" turns into static. The three dissenting justices in
Hernandez emphasized the intervention of the police into Her-
nandez's motoring trip and believed that the police's action ne-
gated any notion that Hernandez's injury arose "out of the owner-
ship, maintenance or use" of his automobile." '
Even the majority would have found no "nexus" if the police
had dragged Hernandez from his car as a suspected embezzler.
Slipping into presumably inappropriate proximate cause language,
the majority stressed that the police were responding to a traffic
offense, so the police officers' action "was not such an intervening
event so as to break the link between petitioner's use of the vehicle
and his resultant injury."' 39 How much better it would be for ra-
tional, democratic government if the court had simply admitted
that phrases such as "arising out of" and "caused by physical con-
tact" do little more in these kind of cases than beg the question of
the court as to the breadth of no-fault coverage. Both occupant
Hernandez and nonoccupant Castagna had borderline no-fault
claims. Hernandez was hurt exiting from his parked car; Cas-
tagna's claim was tied to a stranger's parked Chevrolet. In both
cases, the parked cars clearly contributed to the injuries. The key
question in each case involved the policy reach of the no-fault law.
"Nexus" and "proximate" and the rest of the world of legal cause
are of little help, except to thicken the fog.
137. Hernandez, 10 Fla. L.W. at 298.
138. Id. (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
139. Id.
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VIII. CAUSATION IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION
The language of proximate cause also appears, on rare occasions,
in opinions dealing with Florida's Workers' Compensation Law.
140
Judges (and deputy commissioners) 14 1 must determine when pe-
ripheral compensation claims are beyond the pale of work-related-
ness. One way to deny coverage to an injured employee is to point
to an off-the-job contributing factor as the proximate cause of the
injury.
Early in this century, before proximate cause got up a head of
steam, spreading the risks of industrial accidents confronted legal
barriers much taller than proximate cause defenses. Conservative
judges listened sympathetically to constitutional attacks against
the workers' compensation acts that progressive legislatures
adopted in the early 1900's. For example, the New York Court of
Appeals struck down the nation's first compulsory workers' com-
pensation statute in 1911.142 New York's statute was adopted, like
others of that period, amidst proponents' cries that the cost of the
product should bear the blood of the working man. New York's
highest court, however, announced forthrightly that it sat not to
preside over the demise of American free enterprise, and that New
York's compensation act violated the due process clause ban on
leftist leveling:
If the Legislature can say to an employer, "You must compensate
your employe' for an injury not caused by you or by your fault,"
why can it not go further and say to the man of wealth, "You
have more property than you need, and your neighbor is so poor
that he can barely subsist; in the interest of natural justice you
must [share]" .
. . . In its final and simple analysis that is taking the property
of A. and giving it to B., and that cannot be done under [due
process] .4
Today, injured workers' rights to compensation are, unlike Car-
dozo's elusive negligence,144 in the air. Present legal battles involve
140. FLA. STAT. ch. 440 (1983).
141. Chapter 440 provides for initial adjudication of workers' compensation claims (from
within the Department of Labor and Employment Security) by deputy commissioners ap-
pointed by the governor.
142. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
143. Id. at 440.
144. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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not constitutional attacks but how broadly to read compensation
acts so as to compensate for the blood of the working man. And
because compensation codes today reflect a community consensus
to "take the property of A and give it to B," judges are wary about
limiting compensation coverage by blaming causes unrelated to the
job for employee injuries.'45 Proximate cause language, moreover,
with its taint of negligence and its history of being a handmaiden
to the defense bar, has been pointedly absent from drafts of com-
pensation bills. The replacement phrase for tying compensation
claims to the workplace usually is, as in Florida's act, "arising out
of and in the course of employment.' '
46
The "arising out of and in the course of employment" phrase
joins proximate cause in being highly ambiguous. Inserting "arising
out of" into compensation laws was a form of punting the football.
Drafters of compensation bills realized that injuries to workers
would occur in contexts where job-relatedness is faint. In such
cases, compensation decisions become less a matter of describing
the job connection than of gauging the proper role of the humani-
tarian impulse. "Arising out of," therefore, like blameworthy proxi-
mate cause, simply poses the value question. Nevertheless, rule-of-
law judges try to squeeze a rule out of "arising out of."
One possible way to handle "arising out of" issues would be to
restate such questions in proximate cause form and to retrace the
path of "traditional causation." But most judges have sought other
verbal tests to illuminate the dark corners of "arising out of and in
the course of employment." The Texas Supreme Court, for exam-
ple, has suggested posing the "arising out of" issue in terms of
whether the worker's job was a "producing cause" of his injury. 4 7
145. Note, Workmen's Compensation-What Is the Range of Compensable Conse-
quences of A Work-Related Injury?, 49 N.C.L. REV. 583, 586-91 (1971).
146. FLA. STAT. § 440.09 (1983). Former First District Judge Robert Smith, whose "dog-
ness" test in his dissent in Mapoles v. Mapoles, 350 So. 2d 1137, 1138-39 (Fla. 1st DCA
1977) failed to keep two-hundred-pound Rueben out of the dog house, once explained in a
student note why drafters of workers' compensation bills substituted "arising out of" for
proximate cause:
To the anonymous Englishman who invented the new phrase [arising out of], and
doubtless to his American counterpart, proximate cause was a concept too sophis-
ticated to serve the utilitarian purpose of compensating injured workmen with a
minimum of delay, too compartmentalized to represent the humanitarian impulse
to pay a workman or his family part of the salary that he could not earn because
of injury or death caused to some extent by his employment.
Note, Workmen's Compensation-Arising Out Of and In The Course Of an Enigma, 9 U.
FLA. L. REV. 311, 312 (1956).
147. Tex. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Staggs, 134 S.W.2d 1026, 1028- 29 (Tex. Comm. App. 1940).
The Commission of Appeals was created by the Texas legislature in 1918 to handle the
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The Texas court reasoned that producing cause is broader in scope
than proximate cause (only the latter requires foreseeableness) and
better fits a compensation plan designed to protect injured workers
regardless of fault.14 8
Professor Larson writes that legal cause is out of place in work-
ers' compensation because it smacks of fault and because "foresee-
ability has no relevance if one is not interested in the culpability of
the actor's conduct. 1' 49 Larson, therefore, would have the courts
forego proximate cause tests when deciding, for example, whether
a claimant's second (off-work) injury is compensable because caus-
ally related to a compensable earlier injury.""0 In these second-in-
jury cases, Larson would set up categories of "quasi [in the] course
of employment" 5 ' and non-"quasi [in the] course of."1 52 Under
Larson's "quasi" scheme, a worker might recover if hurt traveling
to her doctor's office for treatment of a prior compensable injury
("quasi . . . course of"), but be denied compensation if the subse-
quent injury occurs during a non-"quasi . . . course of" lark.153
Unfortunately, too much of Larson's "quasi . . . course of" could
make one homesick for proximate cause, or worse, lead to the ulti-
mate doomsday test: A quasi-proximate cause measured by the
quasi-foreseeability of the quasi-reasonable woman.'
In Florida, the observation of a court twenty-five years ago that
"[o]bviously, the law of proximate causation has no place in the
Workmen's Compensation Law"' 55 is today obviously untrue. Legal
or proximate cause has taken root in the state's compensation ju-
risprudence, despite earlier efforts to keep proximate cause at bay
that include this Industrial Commission's discussion about whether
a corporate executive's fatal fall in a hotel shower during a busi-
increased amount of litigation coming before the supreme court. See Philquist, The Su-
preme Court of Texas, 1 TEx. B.J. 7, 8 (1938).
148. Id.
149. Larson, Range of Compensable Consequences in Workmen's Compensation, 21
HASTINGS L.J. 609, 610 (1970).
150. See 1 LARSoN, THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 13.00-.12 (1985).
151. Id. § 13.11(d), at 3-378. "Arising out of" and "in the course of" technically refer to
distinct employment relationships.
152. Id.
153. Id. § 13.11, at 3-380-82; § 13.13, at 3-398.
154. See A. HERBERT, UNCOMMON LAW 6 (2d ed. 1969) for the view that "at Common Law
a reasonable woman does not exist."
155. Linden v. Reed Constr. Corp., 115 So. 2d 706, 707 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959). This court
stripped all the fat and some bone off the concept of "arising out of": "[T]here must be a
connection but not necessarily a causal relation between the employment and the accident
for the accident to arise 'out of' the employment." Id. at 708.
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ness convention was an injury "arising out of":
Too often, we. . . are prone to treat this phrase as though it were
(1) "proximately . . ." or (2) "legally caused by the employ-
ment.". . . "Arise" does have something to do with causal con-
nection but there are many shades of meaning to causal connec-
tion. It is our feeling that the "arising" phrase of the function of
the employment is passive while "caused by" or "proximately
caused" are or should be active. The employment is a condition
out of which the event arises rather than the force producing the
event in an affirmative fashion. Physical causation by the sur-
roundings is not required in order to satisfy what is implied by
this phrase of the Act. . . . [S]uch. . . surroundings. may be
passive, active or inert.1"
The Florida Supreme Court denied certiorari without opinion. 57
Persistent proximate cause, before it eventually infiltrated Flor-
ida compensation law, changed its first name from proximate to
direct. So Florida courts today on occasion measure the scope of
workers' compensation protection by talking about the "direct and
natural" results of job-related activities. The Florida Supreme
Court framed the modern doctrine this way:
The basic rule is that a subsequent injury, whether an aggrava-
tion of the original injury [or a new and distinct injury], is com-
pensable if it is the direct and natural result of a compensable
primary injury. But if the subsequent injury is attributable to
claimant's own negligence or fault, the chain of causation is bro-
ken, even if the primary injury may have contributed in part to
the occurrence of the subsequent injury.'"
The same court two years later denied recovery for consequent-
ial (to a primary compensable injury) disabilities triggered by eco-
nomic anxiety by declaring that "as in the doctrine of proximate
cause generally," the subsequent disabilities must be "a natural
and direct" consequence of "an unbroken chain of causation"
linked back to the initial injury.8 9 By the 1980's, proximate or le-
156. Grady v. Great S. Trucking Co., 1 Fla. Compensation Rep. 113, 114-15 (emphasis in
original) (award of the full Florida Industrial Commission), cert. denied, 85 So. 2d 762 (FIa.
1955).
157. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Grady, 85 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1955).
158. Sosenko v. American Airmotive Corp., 156 So. 2d 489, 492 (Fla. 1963) (quoting 1
LARSON, THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 13.11 (1964)).
159. Apgar & Markham Constr. Co. v. Golden, 190 So. 2d 323, 325-26 (Fla. 1966).
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gal cause was at home in Florida compensation law, with the su-
preme court in D'Angelo Plastering Co. v. Isaac'60 denying com-
pensation on a causation basis to an employee named Isaac who,
while on crutches recuperating from earlier job-related injuries to
his heel and back, was run over by a negligent driver. The court
admitted that pedestrian Isaac might have stepped out of the car's
path had not his earlier job-related accident handicapped him;
nevertheless, the auto driver was the "intervening cause" of Isaac's
second round of injuries.161 The court agreed that Isaac's auto col-
lision had "some causal connection" to Isaac's employment, 62 but
because the auto accident was not a "direct and natural result of
the compensable primary injuries," the earlier compensable pri-
mary accident was not the "legal cause" of Isaac's auto-accident
injuries. 63
Despite the D'Angelo case, compensation law, with its vigorous
risk-spreading, pro-claimant thrust, is nevertheless infertile soil for
spreading the proximate cause defense. But how about strict prod-
ucts liability? How hospitable to proximate cause is this more re-
cent addition to the no-fault family?
IX. STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND PROXIMATE FAULT
Professor Maleson's 1978 article,6 on which this Article draws
heavily, decries resort to proximate cause to limit defendants' re-
sponsibility in strict products liability actions. Maleson traces the
deplorable extent to which the use of "proximate fault"'6 5 in the
United States has diluted the concept of strict liability. Maleson
regrets that few courts or commentators have questioned the use of
proximate cause in strict liability actions.' 6 Yet Maleson's theme,
160. 393 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1980)
161. Id. at 1068.
162. Id. at 1067.
163. Id. at 1068. For a more recent case granting recovery for a "direct and natural"
aggravation of an earlier compensable back injury caused by stepping out of a van 16 to 18
inches to the ground, see Singletary v. Mangham Constr. Co., 418 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 1st DCA
1982). Again, in 1984, the first district cited "ordinary proximate cause standards" in dis-
cussing whether the scope of protection offered under the state's workers' compensation law
extended to post-accident damages attributable to the claimant's inability to obtain further
employment. City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So. 2d 573, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA), petition for
review denied, 458 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1984).
164. Maleson, supra note 6.
165. Maleson, supra note 6, at 17. "[P]roximate cause is a fault doctrine meaning proxi-
mate fault rather than proximate causation because the doctrine does not concern causation
but is used instead to limit responsibility." Id. (citation omitted).
166. Maleson, supra note 6, at 3 n.9. For an article critical of Florida's reading of fault
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as is the case in this Article, is that "[m]ere words will not solve a
problem as complex as limiting a defendant's responsibility" 1 7 in
no-fault situations.
"Mere words," however, sufficed for Florida's Second District
Court of Appeal in Watson v. Lucerne Machinery & Equipment,
Inc.168 Charles Watson, whose representative filed the Watson
(products liability) action, died at the citrus processing plant
where he worked, his head crushed by the rotating arm of a large,
allegedly defective machine known as the Kinsey Sampler. 169 The
defendant-manufacturer defeated the claim at the summary judg-
ment stage. The district court held that the Kinsey Sampler, even
if its safety features were inadequate to provide reasonable protec-
tion to nearby workers, nevertheless was not, as a matter of law,
the proximate cause of Watson's death; the proximate cause of
Watson's death was Watson's own action in voluntarily crawling
into the Kinsey Sampler during its operation. 70
The Watson court, in light of the bizarre facts surrounding Wat-
son's death, was faced with a policy choice whether to extend the
strict products liability theory to cover this particular accident.
Cause in fact was not an issue. Of course, Charles Watson's ac-
tions, as well as the Kinsey Sampler's rotating arm, were causally
connected to Watson's death. The court's causation reasoning is a
sham, revealing again the inability of courts to analyze issues
clearly and to develop policy rationally.
The notion of "proximate fault" fits Watson because Watson's
contributory negligence, if any, should not have barred a strict lia-
bility claim. Yet the Watson court, faced with a no-fault claim in-
volving a presumably careless decedent, was uncomfortable with
imposing strict liability. By using proximate cause, the court
slipped fault back in to defeat the Watson plaintiff's no-fault
claim. Thus, the Kinsey Sampler may be a killer of sorts, but
Charles Watson's demise, as the district court put it, "was caused
solely by his own actions and was not contributed to by any defect
in the Kinsey Sampler. ' 1'
This last quote makes no sense, except perhaps for lawyers
doctrines into strict products liability, see Parks, Watts-Fitzgerald & Watts-Fitzgerald, 1978
Developments in Florida Law, Products Liability, 33 U. MiAWi L. REV. 1185 (1979).
167. Maleson, supra note 6, at 37.
168. 347 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1977).
169. Id. at 460.
170. Id. at 461.
171. Id. (emphasis in original).
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whose senses have been dulled through constant repetition of cau-
sation's soporific axioms. The allegedly unsafe Kinsey Sampler
crushed the life out of Watson, just as surely as Shane's red wagon
struck her master's playmate. The issue in Watson, never faced by
the court, involved scope of liability. Moreover, the court's awk-
ward revival, in a no-fault context, of the contributory negligence
defense through a proximate cause disguise has another disturbing
feature. It means that in similar strict liability contexts the com-
mon law's absolute defense of contributory negligence lives on sub
rosa without the softening influence of the comparative negligence
trade-off. 17 2
Strict products liability is less than ten years old in Florida, and
few appellate cases involving this new theory of liability have in-
voked proximate cause reasoning. 17 To the extent that Florida
courts feel the need to soften the severity of strict liability, there
are available doctrinal devices such as adjusting the definition of
"defect." The proximate cause escape hatch remains, however, a
part of Florida's products liability law, as evidenced by a federal
court's application of Florida law in Kroon v. Beech Aircraft
Corp.171 Pilot Kroon claimed after an accident that the gust-lock
on his airplane was defective. The defendant manufacturer won at
the pleading stage because Kroon carelessly had failed to check the
gust-lock: The court found that Kroon's negligence (and this, a
strict liability case) was the "sole proximate cause of the
accident. ' '175
X. CONCLUSION
If in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was Proximate,
we need a new beginning. Words should be slaves, not masters.
The purpose of this Article has been to keep Moby Dick on the run
and to keep exposed the scope-of-liability policy issues that arise
in tort cases where, too often, traditional practice falls back on
"traditional causation" for rationales too lame to withstand
172. See Parks, supra note 166; see also Jones v. Auburn Mach. Works Co., 353 So. 2d
917 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), aff'd, 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979) (sixteen-year-old boy hurt by
machine in case similar to Watson, except that boy's employer instructed him to move close
to the machine. The second district this time held issue of proximate cause was for jury).
173. See Builders Shoring & Scaffolding Equip. Co. v. Schmidt, 411 So. 2d 1004, 1006-07
(Fla. 5th DCA 1982), petition for review denied, 419 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1982). Schmidt is
typical in that the court assumed that the proximate cause defense lives in products liability
law, although the court's holding seems to be that plaintiff proved no defect.
174. 628 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1980).
175. Id. at 893.
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scrutiny.
Proximate cause is a legal headache principally because judges
and lawyers too often debate proximate cause without clarifying
the true nature of the issue. The distinction between cause-in-fact
and scope-of-liability questions should be made and the functions
of judge and jury allocated accordingly.
In strict liability cases, we need a language for talking sensibly
about limits to liability. If fault is supposedly out the window in
no-fault cases, its doctrinal trappings should also be scrapped. An-
swers to liability issues will spring from no magic formula. "Rea-
soned analysis must wrest dominion from the tyranny of
doctrine." '176
176. Maleson, supra note 6, at 37.
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